[P2PSIP] Stephen Farrell's No Objection on

[Stephen Farrell]

Stephen Farrell has entered the following ballot position for
draft-ietf-p2psip-share-09: No Objection

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COMMENT:
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- General: this feels more like an experimental spec. If the
authors didn't object I think that'd be more appropriate.

- General: can these ACLs be resources to which access is
controlled via another of these ACLs? If so, then it seems like
there may be some nasty corner-cases where things get lost (so
nobody can change 'em in future) and I don't see how one might
recover from that. (Apologies if I'm just mixed up here, I read
this fairly quickly and didn't reload RELOAD into my little head
first;-)

- 3.1: 24 bits of collision resistance isn't many. I'm not clear
why that's ok

- 3.1, last para: SHA-1 isn't a good example really, SHA-256
would be better today.

- 5.3: Is the mapping to USER and DOMAIN from certificates
well-defined? It may be in RELOAD, I forget, sorry;-) It doesn't
seem to be well-defined here anyway.

[Thomas C. Schmidt]

Hi,

please see inline.

Post by Stephen Farrell
Stephen Farrell has entered the following ballot position for
draft-ietf-p2psip-share-09: No Objection
When responding, please keep the subject line intact and reply to all
email addresses included in the To and CC lines. (Feel free to cut this
introductory paragraph, however.)
Please refer to https://www.ietf.org/iesg/statement/discuss-criteria.html
for more information about IESG DISCUSS and COMMENT positions.
https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-p2psip-share/
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- General: this feels more like an experimental spec. If the
authors didn't object I think that'd be more appropriate.

Well authors hope(d) for this to serve as an enabling standard ...

Post by Stephen Farrell
- General: can these ACLs be resources to which access is
controlled via another of these ACLs? If so, then it seems like
there may be some nasty corner-cases where things get lost (so
nobody can change 'em in future) and I don't see how one might
recover from that. (Apologies if I'm just mixed up here, I read
this fairly quickly and didn't reload RELOAD into my little head
first;-)

No. The ACL is itself a shared resource owned by the initial creator
that will have full rights as long as the resource (and the owner)
exist. There is no way of disabling the owner.

Post by Stephen Farrell
- 3.1: 24 bits of collision resistance isn't many. I'm not clear
why that's ok

This actually is meant for small numbers and the storing peer protects
against collisions (see SecDir review).

Post by Stephen Farrell
- 3.1, last para: SHA-1 isn't a good example really, SHA-256
would be better today.

This is from Reload - we are not specifying overlay hash functions in
this document.

Post by Stephen Farrell
- 5.3: Is the mapping to USER and DOMAIN from certificates
well-defined? It may be in RELOAD, I forget, sorry;-) It doesn't
seem to be well-defined here anyway.

Yes, certificate and usernames are held in correspondence by reload.

Cheers,
Thomas